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Abstract 
This study focuses on how civil militias in Banten and Lampung do their 
persistence in society. Civil militias play significant role in society not only as 
being intermediaries between civil societies themselves and the government, 
but also as a mediator between the different political levels of society: In 
addition, the existence of martial arts groups give contributions as initiation 
bases for the activist masses.  This study on civil militias also shows how 
political parallel networks compete for power, beyond the parties and political 
chairs. 
Keywords: civil militias; vigilante groups; martial arts; politics; political Islam; 
violence; Reformasi; Indonesia. 
Introduction 
In Indonesia2, many anthropological and socio-political specialists have 
reported that nowadays in most provinces, society is deeply structured by a 
number of more or less institutionalized paramilitary, criminal and vigilante 
groups3. Other kinds of semi-formal groups also interact and compete in the 
political scene, like lobby-style political intermediaries4 and various types of 
local strongmen networks5. Regional and national-scales oligarchies seem to be 
at the center of these groups’ resilience and constraints6, but the elites who 
happen to be labeled as “reformist” also have to deal with these actors, due to 
their involvement in a wide semi-institutionalized system of arrangements and 
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backings7. These numerous forces form a large power sphere that involves 
altogether political power, economical influence, religious authority, and social 
leadership. Therefore, power conceptions and power modes of exercise 
represent complex questions that need to be investigated both by detailed local 
ethnographies and by extended comparative studies. 
Another significant aspect is the power structures’ delimitation and their 
transformation according to the sociopolitical evolutions. Indeed, in 
Indonesia, the historical national construction process has been marked by a 
contrasted local intertwining between the semi-formal power actors, previously 
evoked, and the State officers, private entrepreneurs, and former army 
members7. For example, during the so-called New Order era (1966-1998) – 
under the regime of President Suharto –, the State fostered and made good use 
of gangs and criminal groups as local intermediaries. They imposed physical 
force on political fields where State action lacked of legitimacy that is to say in 
spheres situated at the fringes of legality 8 . Street-level strongmen (with 
vernacular denominations, like gali, bromocorah or preman)were allowed to carry 
out their activities, such as protecting rackets and controlling over particular 
localized sectors of the economy, in return of a profits’ cut that would be 
distributed through the various levels of the state bureaucracy. 
Since the period called Reformasi, which began in 1998, a 
decentralization and democratization process has been initiated with some 
significant advances9. Nevertheless, according to Ian Douglas Wilson10, this 
was at the beginning accompanied by an upsurge in violence, coercion and 
extortion carried out by organizations including members of paramilitary, 
criminals and vigilante groups. Vedi Hadiz11 also underlined that ‘political 
gangsters’ and vigilantes were the major beneficiaries of the decentralization 
reforms. This process also resulted into a more fragmented intertwining of the 
State with informal “constellation of power”10. Therefore, civil society and 
political institutions are intermediated by numerous organizations that form 
an ever changing and complex power panorama, according to the national 
political evolutions and the regional dynamics. 
The western part of Java, particularly Banten province, and the Sumatra’s 
southern region, Lampung, underwent deep transformations endured by 
informal political networks since their access to provincial autonomy status, 
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respectively in 2000 and 1964. These networks are marked by a partial 
institutionalization, through the integration of some of their elements into 
State politico-economical management’s mechanisms. Their leaders have for 
example gained positions as governors, prefects, mayors, deputies, senators, as 
much as in the state administration and economical organs, like the 
Commerce and industry chamber (Kamar dagang dan industry/Kadin). They 
also mobilized new ideological repertoires, by adjusting them to the new flux 
and to the recent access to information and communication technologies11. By 
its geographical position between Jakarta and Sumatra, Banten is a very 
strategic region for Indonesian development projects, while Lampung, as a 
transmigration area, has numerous and complex constellations of authority 
networks. Therefore, a comparative study is interesting to carry out in regard to 
the geographical proximity of the regions, the shared history, the prevalence of 
informal political networks and also the significant organization of power in 
both provinces. 
There is a vast amount of social science research about the semi-legal 
networks’ State entrenchment. But the inclusion of these groups into wider 
political spheres situated at various levels of both State and society is less 
documented. I will try to show that in Banten’s and Lampung’s cases, the 
power set in which social and political elite evolve encompasses altogether 
State institutions, politico-economic and social organizations, as well as local 
authority institutions defined here as encompassing local religious personalities 
(ustadz, ulama, syekh and kiai) and ritual initiation – including the therapeutics 
and fighting techniques of the martial arts (silat) and invulnerability practices 
(debus)12 – masters (guru and sesepuh). This extended set of sociopolitical actors 
forms in several means informal and personalized networks that are parallel to 
the State while interacting and interpenetrating with it. It then does not only 
mirror or shadow the State15; it does compose what I call “parallel political 
networks”. It appears that our knowledge of the transversal dimension of this 
kind of networks is thin and needs to be improved for a better understanding 
of political Indonesian issues. 
To examine these questions I will briefly present how power is regionally 
conceived and enacted. In a second step, I will describe the main historical 
evolutions undergone by the local authority networks’ position into the power 
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sphere. We will then examine the role of martial arts organizations as 
interfaces in the local distribution of power. These groups are at the center of 
civil militias that gather political parties, bureaucracy and civil society. Finally, I 
will comment the ideological repertoires mobilized by the civil militias’ actors 
and the way their discourses are locally regarded.  
Conceptions of power in Banten and Lampung 
Due to the religious dimension of power relations in Southeast Asian 
societies, and particularly in Indonesia, 13  the study of politics in the 
Archipelago leads to anthropological considerations concerning the 
conception of power. This perspective underlines the question of the relational 
and hierarchical dimensions of power. This aspect is particularly prevalent 
considering the main power figures in Banten and Lampung: the religious 
leaders named kiai and the strongmen called jawara. 
Kiai are the heads of the Muslim boarding schools pesantren and they 
exert strong influence upon the local communities. Many of them appear to be 
close to Mecca networks – Banten had the most important figures concerning 
the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) at the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th 
centuries and many kiai taught at Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. In the XIXth 
century, they also developed their own Sufi practices, under the local 
brotherhood Qadiriyah wa Naqsbandiyah.14 
Jawara are the masters of the martial initiations called silat. They 
endeavor four dimensions of power. First, they master techniques of physical 
protection and they practice a set of rituals that enable them to channel an 
energy called eusi(s.), that is from divine origin, is invisible and supra-mundane. 
This energy can be concentrated in a place (then called kramatan), an object 
(then known as pusaka), an animal or a person (who is then told sakti). It can 
also circulate: it is not only channeled, reinforced and ritually transferred; it 
can also be transmitted through descent and kinship. It can provide its owner 
the capacities of invulnerability, invincibility, invisibility, ubiquity, or longevity. 
These faculties are markers of a sacred force (kasékten). 
This channeling is also a source of acquisition of some know-how, 
particularly ritual ones. I have extensively documented the purification ritual 
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called keceran that is practiced in hundreds of martial initiation schools in 
Banten and Lampung15. During keceran, all the initiates gather, recite collective 
Muslim prayers, enunciate political discourses, perform martial dances and 
fights and summon protective ancestors’ entities to be possessed. Possession 
enables them to obtain signs that will be collectively interpreted regarding the 
agrarian practices, economical decisions, political strategies and social 
practices. The heart of the ritual consists of the sprinkling of purification water 
in the eyes of the initiates by the master. Keceran provides violence a 
subordinate place in a values order where religious aspects are prevalent, 
particularly the link to martial and invulnerability initiations, the relation with 
protective spirits and ancestors, the affiliation to the religious Islamic boarding 
schools pesantren and the connection to local Sufi brotherhoods, namely 
Qadiriyah wa Naqsbandiyah in Banten and Rifaiah in Lampung. Keceran also 
indicates the preeminence of intergenerational and ancestry links: the relations 
between elder and younger, the reference to founding ancestors, the 
importance of brotherhoods’ and rulers’ genealogies. Finally, this ritual values 
the locality through the reference and pilgrimages to cosmological and mystical 
centers. The persons able to concentrate this energy in an expert way develop a 
set of systemic esoteric knowledge that are categorized under the term elmu(s.). 
This knowledge power is the ownership of the saints, magicians, sorcerers, and 
sovereigns who are considered as sacred kings and jawara. Jawara are well 
known to be skillful in mastering elmu16 in such a way that they can use it to 
reach the Unity of Being (wahdat al-wujud), as this one is conceived in the local 
religious variations, and particularly in their Sufi form. 
Elmu determines the legitimacy of the jawarato held the functions of 
initiation masters, as well as the role of religious and ritual officers for the 
villages’ and neighborhoods’ communities. It also provides them a reputation 
that spread far beyond their living localities. This fame is the base of a 
legitimacy that produces consent and from which the jawara embody a status 
of authority (s.wibawa). Authority is designed here as the capacity to influence 
others, and eventually to command obedience. In return, its owner has several 
obligations toward the community he influences. Further, the members of the 
community spontaneously collaborate together to serve the collective objectives 
carried out by the authority representative. 
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Moreover, as the leaders of martial initiation practices, jawara embody a 
potential of the population’s mobilization and a capacity of coercion. It led 
them to interact with the different governments that succeeded all along 
Banten’s and Lampung’s history. The progressive Dutch colonial occupation 
positioned a number of these authority figures as political intermediaries. In 
the course of the Indonesian national construction on the XIXth century 
several jawara became the region’s main political actors. Reciprocally, the 
legitimacy provided by silat initiation as a base of power led many political 
representatives to be initiated to silat or to take representation functions within 
the initiation schools. Then, the frontiers between the initiation groups and 
the political institutions are fluid and porous because there is a crossed 
implication of the respective agents in both these two fields of social life.  
In this context, the practices and imaginaries of physical coercion that 
are embodied by the jawara participate to the articulation – both at the level of 
practices and ideas – of their authority status and their political functions. The 
convertibility that exists between these different dimensions of power 
contributes to the constitution of an original form of power that I propose to 
identify with the notion of “strength”. Thus, this power dimension embodied 
by the jawara leads me to define them as “strongmen”. The position of jawara 
in Banten’s and Lampung’s societies have endured deep transformations in the 
course of the regional histories and so did the different dimensions of power 
that are sacred force, religious authority, political functions and strength 
through a coercion capital.   
Historical transformation of the regional power networks 
At the beginning of the XIXth century, after several centuries of the 
local sultans’ reigns, Banten and Lampung political panorama endured drastic 
reshaping. Lampung was part of the Banten Sultanate until it was annexed by 
the Dutch in 1752 and became a Residentie of the Dutch East Indies. Beginning 
in 1834, after a few decades of Raffles’ domination and the struggle of the local 
Sultans, Radin Inten and then after his son Radin Imba Kusuma, the region 
was ruled by the Dutch. As for Banten sultanate, it was dissolute in 1813 by 
the colonial. 
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The Dutch administration commanded through repression and 
implemented discriminatory laws. The colonial government based the 
administrative mechanism on a Western model, placing sultans and their 
families under its direction and converting some of them into bureaucrats. The 
Dutch administration particularly used the local influence of the strongmen. 
As stressed by Yanwar Pribadi17, in colonial Java, almost every region had its 
own word to identify such figures, such as brengseng in Banyumas, warok in 
Ponorogo, bromocorah in Kediri, bangkrengan or gento in Tegal, lenggaong in 
Pemalang, blaterin Madura, palang, kebayan or weri in East Java, jawara in 
Banten, Batavia and West Java. Strongmen acted as power brokers in several 
regions. In Banten and Lampung, they collaborated with kiai and placed 
themselves in an intermediary strategic position between administration and 
the people. While some jawara groups and individuals involved as supervisors 
for the Dutch administration18 and other lived from robbery, Michael Charles 
Williams19 has convincingly shown that many of the jawara tightly collaborated 
with kiai and played a key role during the numerous anti-colonial rebellions of 
the 19th century. 
This authoritarian politics led to numerous peasants’ protests, where 
the role of kiai and jawara was central20. Thus, in the 19th century in Lampung, 
Radin Imba II and his son Radin Inten II (1834-1856), the grand-son of Radin 
Inten I), also led anti colonial rebellions. After the first was exiled and the 
second was shot, the colonial developed large crop plantations of tobacco, 
coffee, rubber and coconut. In the same century, Banten endured the most 
numerous anti colonial rebellions of the Archipelago. In 1888 a religious-
political movement disrupted, essentially led by the kiai, as Sufi brotherhood’s 
leaders, and jawara. The leading figures initiated descent chains of Islamic 
militancy that would be on the first line during a number of large scale 
insurrections. They coordinated their political activities with the national scale 
organizations of Sarekat Dagang Islam and the communist groups that 
organized a wide revolt in 1926. 
During these uprisings local Sufi practices invulnerabilities were a 
central tool of motivation for rebellion 21 . However, nationalist groups’ 
coordination also played an increasing role in the mobilizations. In the 
beginning of the 20th century, Lampung represented a large working source for 
Bantenese peasants and thousands of them went there from April to August to 
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work in pepper plantations. In the years 1910 there were around 30 000 
workers that crossed annually the Sunda straight22. With the 1929 global crisis 
Lampung’s pepper devaluated and reconfigured this working migration 
organization. It reinforced the difficulties for both populations and widened 
the recruitment scope of the socio political militant movements. Apart from 
the idealist collaboration between kiai and jawara toward the practices of 
purification (under the label jihad), brigands and criminals also formed part of 
the militant movements. In 1942, the Japanese occupation provided the 
underworld its first taste of the opportunities offered by major political 
change23. The relationship between state and criminals was also ambiguous 
during the struggle for Indonesian independence in 1945-1949. 
After independence, Banten’s regional representative, the Resident 
Achmad Chatib, was a prominent jawara and the administration was mainly 
formed by jawara and kiai. They became a main concern for the President 
Sukarno’s government as some of them composed the ranks of the separatist 
Islamist movement of Darul Islam. At the same time, others helped the local 
divisions of the army to fight these opponents. In Lampung also, Darul Islam 
spread, apparently with connections to Bantenese Islamist groups. These 
connections lasted for decades and some are still prevalent nowadays in some – 
claimed and real – transnational jihadist movements24. As noticed by Pribadi28, 
reactions to New Order’s anti Islam policy count Komando Jihad (1977), 
Jama’ah Imran Movement (1981), the TanjungPriok Riot (1984) and the 
repression of the Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan Warsidi Lampung (1989). 
As religious leaders represented the strongest local power under 
President Suharto’s New Order regime, the government appointed a jawara’ 
leader, Chasan Sochib, to work together with the army and government 
officials from the capital, Jakarta. He had helped his father to develop a rice 
business between Banten and Lampung and in 1969-1970 he sold cloves from 
Lampung in Banten. In both regions he was close to the jawara networks and 
was then provided the task of unifying the religious forces, which were 
composed by Islamic schools (the pesantren of Mathla’ul Anwar, close to 
Nadlatul Ulama, and the modernist madrasah of Al Khaeriyah) and prominent 
Islamic leaders. They were pressured by the regime’s political organ, Golkar. 
The organization in charge of this co-optation, the Ulamas’ work unit (Satuan 
Karya Ulama, Satkar Ulama), worked together with national institutions, like 
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the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI). Chasan 
Sochib later created the organization PPPSBBI (also known as Pendekar 
Banten) in 1971. Through the extended jawara network he developed in this 
organization, Sochib managed to rule the informal power relations during 
three decades. After Reformasi, the two mandates held by Chasan Sochib’s 
elder daughter, Atut Chosiyah, as governor and the vice-governor position held 
by the son of Atut Chosiyah since 2017 add to extensive politico-economical 
monopolies and indicate a strong resilience the so-called Chasan Sochib’s 
“dynasty”25. In this power panorama, counter powers are effectively co-opted 
under the game of political coalitions and economical arrangements. 
As for Lampung, the power panorama seems to be more contrasted. 
The seven million inhabitants count a large part of migrants’ descendants from 
Java, Madura and Bali who arrived through the transmigration program that 
started at the beginning of the 20th century of the initiative of the Dutch 
colonial government. The region obtained the province status in 1964 and 
developed its own local political dynamics but during Suharto era it still 
endured the influenceof some Bantenese strongmen and political actors. The 
region also indicates the important role of Bantenese entrepreneurs, 
particularly in the agricultural sector – it counts for around thirty nine percents 
of the economy, mainly with productions of coffee, rice, corn, sugar cane, 
pepper and cows cattle. Banten’s influence is also indicated by the activity of 
strong militia style organizations that act as political brokers and maintained 
until recently the position of Bantenese leaders as political and economical 
intermediaries between Lampung, the capital Jakarta and Java.  
The martial arts groups as crossroads in the distribution of power 
Since the so-called Reformasi era following the fall of President 
Suharto in 1998, the setting up of decentralization and regional autonomy 
laws, links between civil society and political institutions have been reshaped at 
the national level. Transformations particularly touched the “community 
organizations” (Organisasi Masyarakat, Ormas), that are deep rooted in local 
communities and benefited from reforms that increased their action capacity. 
Whereas some of those organizations are widely independent from State’s 
control, others are deeply institutionalized at the regional levels, dealing with 
provincial governments, political parties and the main religious institutions. 
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Since they have membership in political instances, they can rely on women, 
youth, social and humanitarian organizations to unify political support forces 
or to promote their political actions. For example, in Jakarta, local citizens and 
politics have to deal with underworld Jakartanese and Bantenese organizations 
when facing the displacing of populations victims of flooding and State’s 
expropriations. Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) is 
currently the more prominent organization that plays this role. It was originally 
an alliance of petty thugs (preman) that presented itself as an Islamist vigilante 
group and progressively positioned as a power broker, as it was recently 
illustrated through the national level demonstrations it coordinated (in 
October, November and December 2016). In Padang, Aceh and Jogjakarta, 
such organizations have strong roles in crisis and catastrophes management. 
My own observations in Banten highlight that humanitarian organizations – 
such as the Red Cross, Taruna Siaga Bencana(Tagana) and Karang Taruna26 – 
are politically oriented both at the departmental and provincial levels. For 
instance, their funds are used to organize political events prior to election 
campaigns. 
During Suharto era in Banten, it is PPPSBBI that played the central 
role of power distribution within the organizations’ panorama. It was a 
crossroads of a large variety of violent groups – ranging from gangs to civil 
militias’ style organizations –, through a game of multiple affiliations. Because 
of its link to silat and invulnerability (debus) schools it represented a coercion 
tool and the threat/use of violence successfully enabled it to guarantee 
Golkar’s winning at every levels of the elections. By having its members as 
representatives in the local parliament, Pendekar Banten has a quasi monopole 
of construction projects in the region. It takes part in industrial affairs in the 
biggest Southeast Asian steelworks site of Krakatau Steel that was chosen for its 
proximity with steel field (which quality was overestimated, what provoked the 
first promoters’ indebtedness). PB also influences the main development 
projects decisions, like the Sunda straight bridge project. The governors of 
Banten and Lampung discussed of this project with Tomy Winata, the 
businessman close to the military interests. They met in the 2010’s in one of 
his luxury hotels in Jakarta and later on his yacht, together with the spokesman 
and legislative council member for Golkar’s Banten branch, Adi Surya 
Dharma. 
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Moreover, PB is represented in Lampung, where it claims to have a 
membership of 120 000 persons and 26 associations (paguyuban) 27 , from 
Bakauhuni harbor in the south until Palembang in the north of the region. On 
August 21th 1999 was founded the Brotherhood union between Lampung, 
Banten and Bugis people (Ikatan Persaudaraan Lampung Sai, Banten dan 
Bugis), for which Chasan Sochib was an honor councilor (penasehat). Many 
Lampung’s parliamentarians and administration members originate from this 
organization. The former regional police commander (South Sumatra and 
West Java), high ranking official in the national police and ex Lampung 
governor (2003-2008; 2009-2014), Sjachroedin Zainal Pagaralam, was himself 
close from Chasan Sochib. 
One of PB’s main collaborators is Kesti TTKKDH organization. It was 
created by a Bantenese in Lampung in 1952 and it developed a huge network 
of silat schools in both regions.28 Some of its representatives supported Golkar 
and nowadays its strength remains important at an informal level. With 
Reformasi, coercion was replaced by money politics and vote buying. As a 
result, the representatives of PPPSBBI and TTKKDH have invested into 
lobbying, through alliances in the media as well as humanitarian, youth, 
women, sport and culture organizations. In Lampung, a branch named 
Yayasan TTKDH has developed independently from Kesti TTKKDH29. Many 
of its membership integrate Paku Banten organization.30 
The dynamics found in Banten and Lampung have been examined in a 
number of recent publications underlining that the Indonesian process of 
decentralization has not always been equal to democratization. Moreover, it is 
stressed that at the regional level the rise of civil society has been limited by the 
strengthening of autocratic networks. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van 
Klinken35 analyzed the role of what they labeled as ‘patrimonial hierarchies’ 
and Ian Wilson36 convincingly underlined that civil militias are still a main 
tool in these hierarchies’ resilience. Under President Suharto, the nationalist 
organization called Pemuda Pancasila developed important rents in various 
economical sectors and it now benefits from a larger freedom to exert its 
activities. It has taken part in the management and implementation plans of 
projects in Padang area, western Sumatra. Another paramilitary agenda arose 
after Reformasi, with the civilian groups of Pamswakarsa that were backed by 
the political intelligentsia to “secure” the political elections. Pamswakarsa was 
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essentially composed by silat tutelary organizations, like Paku Banten and 
TTKDH’s branches of Lampung. The members appear to have been recruited 
by EMS, an influent person in Banten’s politics, through a backing of general 
Wiranto 31 . EMS is the owner of a transport firm between Banten and 
Lampung and he is very close form MM, president of a commission in 
Banten’s parliament and a relative of the Islamic party PPP’s top leaders in 
Lampung, where he is also an important investor. 
Thus, in the aftermath of Reformasi, several former army and police 
members made use of discrete budgets to finance and support private militias. 
The most prominent case is exgeneral Prabowo Subianto32, a serious challenger 
for the next presidential elections in 2019. He first backed the Young knights 
of Indonesia (Satria Muda Indonesia, SMI) an organization that assisted the 
military Special Forces when Prabowo headed it and later supported his 
political party, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, 
Gerindra). After Reformasi and a volunteer exile in Jordan, Prabowo came 
back into the informal power scene through his leadership of the national and 
international federations of pencak silat, respectively the Indonesian union of 
pencak silat (Ikatan Pencak Silat Indonesia, IPSI) and the International union 
of silat (Persatuan Silat Antarbangsa, PERSILAT). He uses these strong 
organizations as lobbying tools and participates to the development – together 
with other oligarchs and ex militaries, like ex President Susilo Bambang 
Yodhoyono – of local vigilante groups that act as political brokers.  
Under these backings, in Jakarta and the close urban regions of the 
Jabodetabek (composed of Jakarta Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi cities), 
numerous silat schools, labeled as Betawi (the people who are locally 
considered to originate from the capital), have formed their own paramilitary-
gangster style organizations. It was the case for the Betawi Brotherhood Forum 
(Forum Betawi Rempug, FBR) and the Children of Betawi Communication 
Forum (Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi, Forkabi) in the first decade of 
Reformasi. More recently, local formations appeared following the mass 
demonstrations against Jakarta’s governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (called 
Ahok), like Brigade 411, an organization under FPI’s tutelary. These 
organizations can mobilize mass support for political parties and in return they 
obtain the direction of development projects and the right to exert racket 
protection in urban territories. These organizations are more or less 
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institutionalized and very influent among communities and administration. 
For example the Islamist vigilante Front Pembela Islam, the Radical Islamist 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahaidin Indonesia), and the 
violent nationalists Pemuda Pancasila and Pemuda Pancamarga have been very 
active in Aceh since the tsunami catastrophe. They act as complements or even 
substitutes of the legal authorities. 
In Banten, a major silat organization is Macan Paku Banten that claims 
a membership over 5 000 and 5 branches.One of the main branches is the 
Banten’s Nail Martial Movements (Jurus Paku Banten), centered in Serang city. 
This school formed an organization in 1992 and it is very influent in Lampung 
under the name of the Familial Cimande Association (Cimande Paguyuban 
Keluarga). The silat schools affiliated to this organization come from a large 
variety of streams, like Terumbu and Bandrong, or Japanese karate. Macan 
Paku Banten was headed by IAA, until his death in 2016. As a descendant of 
the fourth sultan, Abul Mafahir(1596-1651), he was the head of Banten’s 
religious center, Banten Lama. He was in rivalry with FC, a son of Banten’s 
first resident, AchmadChatib, but unlike him he collaborated with the 
authorities under Suharto era and then after supported the political figures 
from Chasan Sochib’s network. He has then be backed by the provincial top 
politicians and continues to act as the religious center’s representative, even 
after the recent enthronization of Bambang Wisanggeni as a sultan - the 
descendant of the last sultan, Maulana Muhammad Shafiuddin (1809-1813)33. 
IAA was close from silat masters of other schools, like Wadi, the great master 
(guru besar) of the Banten Cimande Barrier (Cimande Pagar Banten), in 
Serang40. This school is affiliated to Pendekar Banten and Wadi studied with 
H. As’ad, an important figure of this organization. Through a branch in
Lampung, IAA was close to Lampung’s last governor, Sjachroedin Zainal
Pagaralam (2003-2008 and 2009-2014). This one headed the Lampung’s
customs Union (Persatuan Adat Lampung, PAL), that included silat schools
and happened to perform in Banten Lama. The collaborations between
schools form part of interregional political common activities. It is illustrated
by the rivalries between Macan Paku Banten and Paku Banten from Lampung.
This one seems to originate from the first and took its autonomy after
Reformasi.
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Paku Banten 
Yayasan 
TTKKDH 
Kesti 
TTKKDH 
Pendekar 
Banten 
TTKKDH 
Banten BPPKB 
Prior to the Lampung parliamentary elections in 2008, the candidate 
Sumarsono used Lampung’s Paku Banten’s support to campaign. In reaction, 
the governor Sjachroedin Z.P. asked for Macan Paku Banten’s support. IAA 
then sent five cars of jawara to Lampung, either to show their strength to Paku 
Banten or to bargain with it. Indeed, IAA’s elder brother, a mastered silat 
practitioner, happened to be a relative of Mukri M.Z., Paku Banten’s leader.  
Mukri developed his charisma thanks to bloody invulnerabilities 
exhibitions34 and was a main support of Sjachroedin Z.P. (who is also President 
of Paku Banten’s Direction committee) during the provincial elections’ 
campaign in 2008.35 More recently, Paku Banten published his support for the 
election of Muhammad Ridho Ficardo as governor (2014-….) and one of 
Mukri’s sons was elected in Lampung provincial parliament. After Mukri’s 
death in 2015 he was replaced by Heriyansyah. 
Those groups are strongly linked and it appears necessary to identify 
the nature of their connections. For example, whereas Pendekar Banten and 
the Organ for Banten Family’s Potential Management (Badan Pembinaan 
Potensi Keluarga Banten, BPPKB) collaborate in the security sector, the same 
Pendekar Banten and TTKKDH have been in strong competition in the 
political scene. Since Reformasi the groups of Lampung have taken autonomy 
from Bantenese ones, by acquiring more independence in politics thanks to 
decentralization laws. The relations that such groups set up with each other 
provide information on the capacity of the State to assume its role in the 
sectors of protection and taxation, and in the executive matters. 
Figure 1: The main martial arts organizations and civil militias in Banten 
and Lampung 
Lampung Banten 
Kawalu: Journal of Local Culture 
Figure 2: A silat demonstration in front of IAA and some of his invites from
Lampung (Banten Lama, 2011)
Figure 3: A sticker figuring H. Mukri practicing invulnerabilities (door of
Paku Banten’s central office, 2011)
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The central role of civil militias to gather political parties, bureaucracy and 
civil society. 
Rooted in the colonial period, patrimonial networks have reinforced 
their structures after independence. In the same way that they were affected by 
the State construction, they influenced the process of its formation. They 
contributed to form what Schulte Nordholt has called a « Shadow State » that 
coexists with bureaucratic institutions, is integrated in the State’s structures 
and in which bureaucrats, businessmen, stakeholders and politicians exert 
their activities in common networks. Since Reformasi, decentralization, 
successive political instabilities and the privatization of public owns – with the 
notable phenomenon of the loss of power of the army and the diminution of 
its State funding, which caused a massive privatization of the security sector36 – 
strongly modified the force relations between public institutions and 
traditional networks of authority. 
This process resulted in the increase of security groups’ autonomy37 and 
it modified their status towards the State, passing from official integrated 
entities in the administrative hierarchy of the New Order, to multiform 
structures in the post-Suharto era. Most of their leaders are former officials of 
the army and the police, businessmen of huge groups founded under Suharto, 
but the civil militias’ networks offer extremely diverse combinations, from 
private groups to institutionalized organizations. For example, I have shown 
that in West Java, Jakarta et Lampung, the patron-client relations between 
security groups, institutions and enterprises are much more fragmented than 
during the New Order, whereas in Banten, where the power keeps a very 
centralized dimension, the traditional networks of the criminality and the 
underworld have enhanced their institutionalization and a phenomenon of 
hyper centralization. 
The considerations on the new dynamics that have emerged since 
Reformasi help to understand some mechanisms of political affiliation, which 
can seem at first sight contradictory. With the free elections system and the 
emergence of parties, “Community organizations” have gained independence 
from the Golkar’s central board. Some have kept the direction of its regional’s 
branches, but most of the candidates multiply their affiliations to diverse 
parties, like PPP or PDIP. They mobilize coalition mechanisms tactically, on 
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very short term and according to electoral conjunctures. They also use new 
methods to gain mass votes. From the violence and coercive methods which 
prevailed under the New Order, they have adopted the distribution of gifts, 
devices of support and lobbying, money politics, the use of bureaucracy and 
Medias, cooptation of intellectuals, scientists and students networks. They have 
taken the direction of women, youth, humanitarian and organizations to 
diffuse an image of promotion of social and philanthropic actions. 
The sanctions-gifts system exerted upon the administrative body, the 
financial dependence of the education and information of sectors have 
prevented the emergence of a strong and politically educated middle class. 
Thus, if decentralization and the multiparty system have increased the role of 
civil society in political life, they have in the same time permitted the 
integration of local informal networks in the State apparatus and the intra 
regional recentralization of the power. It has favored – mainly in the first part 
of the decentralization process – the rise of identity ideologies, as well as the 
politicization of nationalist, ethnical and religious groups which were kept out 
of the political scene before 38 . It has led to the use of self relatives’ 
monopolistic strategies as a way to centralize power, which efficacy is 
reinforced by the plural direction functions that adopt their members. 
Thus, huge structural problems prevent the full consolidation of 
democracy and its benefits for civil society. The persistence and reinforcement 
of centralistic regional elites is one of the main concerns39. These ones are 
characterized by the weakness of executive power, inequalities for electoral 
campaigns, the weak role of civil society and women in political affairs, 
nepotism practices in the governments, the parliaments and the parties. Then, 
one of the main challenges to consolidate democracy relies on the 
restructuration of the executive which would guarantees the integrity of the 
judiciary system. Social mobility is another indicator of the democratization 
process. It may be stimulated through a fair educative system, the transparence 
of nominations in the education sector and in the competitive examination for 
the integration in the public service. The rise of civil society’s role in 
Indonesian society will also be linked with the favoring of Medias’ 
independence and the disposal for a fair access to the political sphere and its 
tools of diffusion.  
17 
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But another key aspect to strengthen the participation of civil society to 
politics that benefit to the common good is a wider socio-historical perspective. 
This process is largely blocked by one sided actors, mainly the inheritors of the 
New Order’s regime, and it adds to a rewriting of Indonesia’s history. With the 
wide use of social media and the high image circulation it favors, the re-
historicization phenomenon appears as a major political convector.  
Civil militias’ legitimating references: religion and ethnicity 
To understand the ideology shaped and mobilized by civil militias’ 
leaders to legitimate their political positions, we are led to examine the historic 
evolution of the other main power pole in Banten and Lampung that is 
political Islam. Indeed, while during the New Order the religious organizations 
were effectively controlled, repressed or co-opted, with Reformasi many Islamic 
groups re-emerge as potential political forces. In the first years of Reformasi, 
the rise of Muslim Brotherhood oriented party, the Prosperous Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), illustrated the changing continuities of 
Islamic networks. Another aspect of this evolution was marked by the militancy 
movements for Islamic law, Sharia. In Banten, some laws were examined by the 
provincial parliament in 2000-2001 and in 2002, EMS, Chasan Sochib’s 
former right hand, founded the Preparatory committee for the Islamic law’s 
application in Banten (Panitia Penerapan Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam Banten, 
P3SIB). He used his position in the editorial board of the radical journal Sabili 
to promote his action 40 . As for Lampung, several members of TTKDH’s 
direction board used their position in the Islamic modernist Muhammadiyah 
organization. 
In the same period, Banten and Lampung also witnessed the civil 
militias’ instrumentalization of religious radicalism as a way of reinforcing 
legitimacy over the political Islamic community. EMS urged Bantenese to 
prepare for jihad in Ambon and notorious Muslim leaders indicated proximity 
with the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah. The actions of Imam 
Samudra, one of the Bali bombings’ main organizers, had a very favorable echo 
in a large part of the population in a period in which liberalization and the 
opening to foreign investments and influences created public anxiety. In that 
time, while PB’s monopolies in the economic and security sector was partly 
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threatened by several personalities from the military Special Forces, Kopassus, 
the organization approached radical groups like Front Hizbullah, headed by 
Cecep Busthomi, one of the FPI’s founders. Pendekar Banten also successfully 
infiltrated the semi-governmental MUI and achieved to counter a fatwa that 
aimed to prohibit debus practice. 
After the 2005 “conservative turn”, as this period was labeled by 
Bruinessen and contributors41, Pendekar Banten aimed to gain control on 
mainstream religious networks, for example through the Friendship forum of 
traditional Islamic boarding schools (Forum Silaturahmi Pondok Pesantren 
Salafi, FSPPS). As a result, for the 2007 governor’s election, when PB 
presented Chasan Sochib’s eldest daughter, Atut Chosiyah, as candidate, she 
obtained the support from a large part of the Muslim leadership. The main 
opponents, like kiaiFC, did not obtained the support they hoped and until 
today they remain largely active under informal ways42. During her second 
mandate, Atut Chosiyah was imprisoned for corruption. After the death of her 
father in 2012 the her family’s political positions reconfigured but many family 
members and relatives still hold key posts in the Bantenese political parties, the 
administration and government. 
In 2014, PB positioned itself as a stronghold against transnational 
jihadism, by publicly declaring hostility towards ISIS. A few times later, EMS 
organized a similar event, by gathering members from the political, military 
and police elite to declare the creation of an anti-ISIS movement, the Front-
mbai. A few times later, in 2016-2017, EMS and Chasan Sochib’s grand-son 
confronted for the provincial elections, respectively as vice-governors with 
Rano Karno and Wahidin Halim. It seems that the national scale 
demonstrations against Jakarta’s governor, Ahok, played a decisive role in the 
urns, as it participated to disqualify the nationalist party PDIP – Rano Karno’s 
party. 
Apart from religious arguments, the local features that were 
instrumentalized were ethnicity and regionalism. They were particularly used at 
the beginning of Reformasi, and more recently they begun to emerge again as 
political levers. A first factor of this references mobilization was 
decentralization. The lack of supra regional control by the recently 
decentralized State facilitated collaborations between regional organizations. In 
Jakarta suburbs, Bantenese groups shared territories with FBR, Forkabi and 
2 
19 
Gabriel Facal: The Persistence of Civil Militias in Banten and Lampung, Indonesia 
20 
Pemuda Pancasila. In Lampung, many youth in the rural areas joined the 
ethnicist Lampung Sai, the main opponent to the pencaksilat organizations 
Paku Banten and TTKKDH43. In Banten, BPPKB conveys ethnic ideology to 
enforce its actions and Pendekar Banten uses religious arguments to take part 
on socio-political life. Regionalist groups support from local elites but also 
from national political actors, as a way to form competitive power to the 
religious organizations that constitute political support bases. This divide-to-
rule-strategy can sometimes be accompanied by fusions between Islamist and 
regionalist ideologies. FBR particularly embodied this association44 and FPI 
tries in many ways to operate the same concentration of militancy references. 
The studies concerning the formation of local ethnicities’ ideology and 
its use by the New Order’s centralistic State provide a diachronic point of view 
on the logics of continuity of the local aristocratic rules 45 . The cultural 
characteristics that are exploited enable to examine hierarchical relations in the 
informal political networks and they help to understand why they can be 
legitimate for local communities. It brings to wider historical and sociological 
considerations about the civil society’s perception of ideological discourses that 
were mobilized under the colonial rule to curb the local cultures into their 
folkloric aspects and to control customary law. These discourses were reshaped 
during the national struggle for independence to unify heterogenic cultures. 
Later, the New Order regime used it to build a hyper centralistic State, and it 
serves nowadays to patrimonial networks that reproduce this power centralism 
at the local level. 
The representatives (tokoh masyarakat) of the local authority are highly 
influential on the communities and they play key functions on the diffusion of 
these ideologies. Through complex political affiliations, negotiations and 
contestations play, they endeavor the role of intermediaries in intra and inter 
community relations as well as between communities and both regional and 
national authorities. Their actions take place in highly diverse spheres, as 
election process, agrarian land distribution, trades implantation and 
management, microfinance and cooperatives projects, high studies access, 
professional opportunities and matrimonial alliances. Consequently, if they are 
involved in underworld networks they can legitimize the political position of 
those parallel groups. Organizations like Pendekar Banten, BPPKB and Paku 
Banten conscientiously maintain the low level of education of the citizens, they 
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control the media and they prevent the rise of a political educated middle class.
On the other hand, they are central to the communities to maintain strong
social coherence and to build strategies aiming to take best advantage of
political and power contexts. Thus, since the pre
organizations is often proportional to the fragility of social links, their study
can help to understand the resilience of local communities when facing
external networks pressures. 
Figure 4: Representatives of BPPKB in Pandeglang,
the organization (2011)
Conclusion: studying Indonesian politics from the bottom
Two decades after the beginning of Reformasi, Indonesian power
relations are still dominated by informal and interpersonal
main actors of this nexus are situated simultaneously in social, economical and
political spheres and then cumulate a set of multiform capital. In this power
panorama, civil militias appear as intermediaries between civil society, the
administration and the government. As semi
mediate the relations between the different political levels of society: different
kinds of elites, the growing middle class and the popular fragments of the
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population. By their transversal structures, the civil militias indicate porosity 
between these social strata but in the same time they participate to their 
fixation.46 At the crossroads of these militias, the martial arts groups play an 
important role as initiation bases for the activist masses and they represent 
legitimating levers for their representatives and contractors. 
The cases I have discussed here in South Sumatra and West Java show 
that the regional civil militias must be understood through regional 
comparison and thanks to a national level perspective. This approach enables 
to point out major changes that occurred in the course of the decentralization 
and democratization processes. With decentralization, the loss of supra 
regional control resulted in different kinds of processes. In Lampung it 
enabled Yayasan TTKDH and Paku Banten to gain autonomy toward Banten’s 
political parallel networks. In Banten it permitted the main civil militias’ 
representatives to reach high-rank political positions while the security sector 
was conquered by new organizations like BPPKB. This organization found the 
possibility to develop beyond the province, in Jakarta and West Java.  
This study also indicates that the civil militias benefit from the support 
of the central government’s officials, as it was shown at the Reformasi 
beginning by their collaboration with national-level paramilitary groups, like 
Satria Muda Indonesia and Pamswakarsa. More recently, the strengthening of 
Pemuda Pancasila (which is finishing the construction of a big buildings 
complex near the police central office in Serang) indicates a strong resilience of 
the collusion phenomenon between the power local representatives and 
national political figures of the dominant oligarchy. In the context of the “post 
anti-Ahok” events and in prevision of the next presidential elections, the study 
of these civil militias points out how political parallel networks compete for 
power, beyond the parties and political chairs. Thus, my objective here is to 
stress the need for the comprehension of the tension within martial arts 
organizations, like the regional Indonesian Pencak Silat People (Masyarakat 
Pencak Silat Indonesia, MASPI) led by reformist elites in Bandung, or the 
national federation IPSI headed by Prabowo Subianto. This kind of study may 
provide significant insights on the dynamics that connect together authority 
leaders, regional and national administration, political representatives and a 
large part of the Indonesian population.  
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